Security

1. The short version

• One account, one set of rows. Every table that holds your content enforces row-level security in the database itself, so another account cannot read your notes even through a bug in the app.
• Encrypted in transit and at rest, in the European Union, backups included.
• Never used to train AI. Our providers are used through business APIs that exclude content from training; their copies are short-lived and described below.
• Yours to take or erase. Export everything, delete a note and its recording, or delete the account — from inside the app.
• We log ourselves. Direct database access by our own team is recorded, and no log or error report ever contains your content.

2. Where your data lives

Your account, notes, transcripts, tasks, projects and uploaded files are stored on Supabase in the European Union (Stockholm, eu-north-1). Connections use TLS; storage and backups are encrypted at rest. The database is Postgres with row-level security enabled on every content table.

The apps hold no local copy of your brain: what you see on your Mac, iPhone or Watch is read live from that one place, which is also what keeps every device in sync.

3. Who can read it

You. Each row carries your account id and the database refuses to return it to anyone else. The same rule applies to the recordings bucket: a signed-in account can list and fetch only its own folder.

People you choose. Sharing a note or a project with a collaborator adds a narrow exception for that person, and only for what you shared. A public share link exposes one note through a random, expiring, revocable token, and never its audio.

Assistants you connect. Connecting Claude or another MCP client issues a token that is stored only as a hash, scoped to read or safe-write, rate-limited, logged for 90 days, and revocable from the app. It can only ever act as you.

Us. We are honest about this one: as the operator we hold the keys to the database, and no technical control stops an administrator from reading a row. What exists instead is a policy of not looking except to fix a problem you have reported, and an audit log of every statement run directly against the database by our team. The founder tooling that shows us usage shows counts and timestamps, never a title or a transcript — that boundary is enforced in code, not by convention.

4. AI providers and retention

Turning speech into notes means sending content to AI providers. These are the ones that see it, with what each one keeps:

None of them may train on this content. The complete list of every third party we use, including the ones that never see content, is in the privacy policy.

5. Recordings

The raw recording is the most sensitive thing we hold — it carries your voice and, in meetings, other people’s. It is kept so you can play it back, and it leaves with the note.

Where it travels depends on how you captured it. Recording a meeting on your Mac sends the audio to our EU storage and to the transcription provider, and nowhere else — nothing joins the call and Recall.ai never receives it. Sending the notetaker hands the call to Recall.ai, which deletes its copy 72 hours later. Voice notes and dictation never involve Recall.ai at all.

• Dictation audio is never stored at all: it is transcribed in memory and discarded. What we do keep is a count — how many words each account dictated this week — so the free allowance can be enforced. A number, never the words.
• From the next app update (Mac 1.20, iPhone 3.2), deleting a note deletes its recording, photos and attachments; until then, ask and we remove them.
• The same update adds a “Delete recordings after transcription” setting: the audio is removed from our servers the moment processing completes, whichever device captured it.
• Deleting the account removes recordings, meeting audio, photos and documents along with every row.

6. Meetings and other people

Recording a conversation involves people who did not install anything, so this section is about them rather than about you.

• The notetaker is visible. It joins as a participant everyone in the call can see, and announces itself in the meeting chat when it arrives. Nobody is recorded by something they cannot see.
• Recording on your Mac keeps a third party out entirely. Capturing the call on your own machine sends the audio to our EU storage and the transcription provider and no further. For a conversation under a confidentiality agreement that is the tighter path, and the app asks for your confirmation before it starts, because nothing else in the call would signal that a recording is running.
• Consent from the room is yours to get. Twelve US states require every participant to agree, not only the person recording. We say so in our terms rather than leaving you to discover it.
• Participants are named, not analysed. We store who was on the call and when they joined so the transcript can attribute what was said. We build no profile of them, and they are never contacted.

7. What you control

• Export — arriving with the next app update as one tap in Settings; today, write to us and we send it within days.
• Delete — a note, a recording, a project, or the whole account, from inside the app.
• Revoke — any connected assistant, share link or collaborator, at any time.
• Opt out — of product analytics entirely; the app works the same either way.
• No password — sign-in is a one-time emailed code, so there is no password of yours for anyone to steal or reuse.

8. Logging and monitoring

Error reports go to Sentry in the EU through a reporter we wrote ourselves so that it can only send an error type, message and stack trace — never a request body, transcript or note. Diagnostic logs from our processing pipeline record lengths, counts and ids rather than text, and are deleted after 30 days. Database statements run by our own team are audited. Sensitive database functions have been reviewed and locked down twice this year, and a read-only invariant suite re-checks the production catalogue for regressions before releases.

9. What we don’t have yet

• No SOC 2 or ISO 27001 certificate. We are a small company; we would rather tell you what the controls are than show a badge we cannot back.
• No end-to-end encryption. Turning your voice into summaries and searchable notes has to happen on a server that can read it. Keys only you hold would switch off everything the product does. If you need audio that never leaves the device, tell us — it is the direction we would build for if enough people ask.
• An independent penetration test is in progress; the summary will be published here when it is complete.

10. Reporting a vulnerability

If you find a security problem, write to privacy@maicontext.com. We will acknowledge within two working days, keep you informed, and credit you if you wish. Please do not access other people’s data while demonstrating an issue.